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Justice Powell joined by Justice O'Con-
ner (concurring) concluded that there were 
historical associations of creation-science 
with the religious belief in the creation of 
the universe by a divine God as described 
in the Bible. These associations, according 
to Justice Powell, were enough to overricj.e 
the fact that the statute did not explicitly 
refer to a religious purpose. 
The Court did leave the door open for 
religious oriented information and 
creation-science to be used in public 
schools; but the purpose must not advance 
a particular religious belief. 
Edwards v. Aquillard follows closely the 
trend of Supreme Court decisions dealing 
with state statutes addressing religion in 
public schools. The Establishment Clause 
is being relied upon in the Court's 
involvement in state educational law, an 
area in which the state and local govern-
ments have a large interest. In recent years 
the Court has invalidated a school dis-
trict's use of public school teachers in re-
ligious schools. Grand Rapids School 
District v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985), and 
the hanging of a copy of the Ten Com-
mandments on a public school wall. Stone 
v. Gragam, 449 U.S. 39 (1980). In these 
two cases the Court found no secular pur-
pose. Edwards also illustrates that in deter-
mining the presence of secular purpose the 
Court will go beyond the definitions in 
the statute to find the motives of the legis-
lature. This is one reason why Justice Sca-
lia has called for a re-evaluation of the 
Lemon secular purpose test. 
-David G. Banister 
The accident took seconds. The rehabilitation took months. ~ 
But with the help of Easter Seals, and a burning spirit, what you . 1't' f . 
see here is not a man with a disability, but a man called Dad. 1:r 
Give to Easter Seals. Give the power to overcome. U" 
Lee v. Wheeler: RECOVERY FOR 
NEGUGENCEOFPHANTOM 
DRIVER UNDER UNINSURED 
MOTORIST PROVISIONS 
On a question certified by the United 
States Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia, the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland held in Lee v. Wheeler, 310 Md. 
233, 528 A.2d 912 (1987) that under an 
automobile insurance policy covering 
Maryland insureds, an uninsured motorist 
provision limiting coverage to situations in 
which there is physical contact between 
the insureds' vehicle and the phantom 
vehicle is unenforceable as against public 
policy under Maryland law. This case 
expanded a similar ruling in State Farm 
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Maryland Auto. Ins. 
Fund, 227 Md. 602, 356 A.2d 560 (1976) by 
making such provisions unenforceable for 
accidents happening outside, as well as 
inside, the State of Maryland. 
Ark and Olivia Lee were residents of 
Maryland whose automobile was titled 
and registered in Maryland. The original 
insurance policy and all renewals were 
addressed and mailed to the Lees' 
Maryland residence and all premiums were 
paid from the same residence. While the 
Lees were operating their vehicle in the 
District of Columbia, a vehicle operated 
by Marlene Wheeler swerved to avoid an 
unidentified (phantom) vehicle that sud-
denly entered her lane of traffic. In the 
process, Wheeler struck the Lees' vehicle 
head-on. 
The Lees brought an action against 
Wheeler in the United States District 
Court for the District of Columbia invok-
ing diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.c. 
§ 1332 (1982). The Lees also joined their 
insurer, Pennsylvania General Insurance 
Company (Pennsylvania General), seeking 
coverage under the policy's uninsured 
motorist provisions for the damages sus-
tained as a result of the phantom's negli-
gence. 
The Lees' claim against Pennsylvania 
General was dismissed because the district 
judge found that the Lees' insurance policy 
expressly required physical contact with 
the phantom vehicle in order for the unin-
sured motorist coverage provisions to ap-
ply and that provision was enforceable 
under District of Columbia law. The Lees 
appealed from the order granting the 
motion to dismiss. 
The United States Court of Appeals for 
the District of Columbia Circuit found 
that Maryland law applied but found no 
pertinent Maryland cases to serve as a 
guide in making a decision. Under Md. 
Cts. & Jud. Proc. Code Ann. § 12-601 
(1984), they certified the following ques-
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tion to the Court of Appeals of Maryland: 
"Under an automobile insurance policy 
covering Maryland insureds, is a provision 
in that policy requiring physical contact 
between the insureds' vehicle and the 
phantom vehicle lawful and enforceable 
under Maryland law where the accident 
occurs outside the State of Maryland?" Lee 
v. Wheeler, 810 F.2d 303, 304 (D.C. Cir. 
1987). 
In answering "no" to the question, 
Judge Adkins reviewed the principle in 
State Farm and expanded it to encompass 
accidents happening outside Maryland 
involving Maryland insureds. 
In State Farm, the Maryland Automobile 
Insurance Fund (MAIF) sought a declara-
tion that an insurance policy requiring, as 
a prerequisite to coverage, physical contact 
between an insured's vehicle and a phan-
tom vehicle violated the uninsured motor-
ist provision of Md. Ann. Code art. 48A, 
§ 541(c) (1957, 1986 Repl. Vol.) which 
mandates that "[i]n no case shall the unin-
sured motorist coverage be less than the 
coverage afforded a qualified person under 
Md. Ann. Code art. 48A §§ 243H and 243-
1." Id. at 237, 528 A.2d at 914. 
Section 243H(a)(1) allows claims for the 
death of or personal injury to qualified 
persons "arising out of the ownership, 
maintenance or use of a motor vehicle in 
this State where the identity of the motor 
vehicle and of the operator and owner 
thereof cannot be ascertained .... " Claims 
against MAIF are authorized without any 
distinction between impact and non-
impact phantom drivers. State Fann, 227 
Md. at 604,356 A.2d at 562. 
Pennsylvania General argued that, due 
to the "in this state" language, "§ 541(c) 
contains an implied territorial limitation 
when read in harmony with § 
243H(aX1)." 310 Md. at 238, 528 A.2d at 
915. 
The court explained that "[t]he primary 
purpose of the § 541(a) uninsured motorist 
coverage requirement is to assure financial 
compensation to the innocent victims of 
motor vehicle accidents who are unable to 
recover from financially irresponsible 
uninsured motorists." 310 Md. at 238,528 
A.2d at 915 (quoting Pennsylvania Nat'l 
Mut. v. Gartelman, 288 Md. 151, 157, 416 
A.2d 734, 737 (1980)). 
Hesitant to imply exclusions or recog-
nize exclusions beyond those expressly 
enumerated by the legislature, the court 
observed that no territorial exclusion or 
limitation is evident within the two 
express exclusions from mandatory mini-
mum uninsured motorist coverage found 
in § 541(cX2). Furthermore, the language 
on which Pennsylvania General relied 
deals with claims against MAIF rather than 
with mandatory motor vehicle liability 
insurance. Due to the legislative history of 
the sections, there is 
a functional continuity of purpose in 
the present MAIF provisions that mili-
tate against reading § 243H as in any 
way qualifying § 541(c)(2) .... The 
provision for compulsory automobile 
insurance, plus the creation of MAIF 
as a liability insurer of last resort, dem-
onstrate the dramatic change in state 
policy with respect to protection of 
the public from the economic harm 
produced by automobile accidents. 
310 Md. at 240, 528 A.2d at 916. 
Judge Adkins went on to say that "[t]o 
insert exclusions by implication or recog-
nize exclusions not expressly prohibited 
by the statute has the dangerous potential 
of seriously frustrating the policies behind 
compulsory automobile liability insur-
ance." Id. at 242,528 A.2d at 917. To allow 
such exclusions "would fly in the face of 
the broadly-protective public policy" 
established through recent case law. Id. at 
243, 528 A.2d at 917. 
The court declined to express an opinion 
on whether Maryland law prohibits a 
physical contact requirement in uninsured 
motorist coverage in commercial policies 
as opposed to personal policies. 310 Md. at 
235-36 n. 1, 528 A.2d at 913. 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland 
expanded the principle of State Farm by 
finding an uninsured motorist provision, 
limiting coverage to situations in which 
there is physical contact between the 
insureds' vehicle and the phantom vehicle, 
unenforceable against public policy under 
Maryland law even when the collision 
occurs outside the State of Maryland. By 
upholding the primary purpose of the 
uninsured motorist coverage requirement, 
this ruling assures financial compensation 
to the innocent victims of motor vehicle 
accidents who are unable to recover from 
financially irresponsible uninsured motor-
ists. 
-Glen P. Smith 
Ellison v. Maryland: CONVICTED 
AND SENTENCED CRIMINAL 
DEFENDANT WHEN CALLED AS 
NON-PARTY WITNESS MAY 
INVOKE PRIVILEGE AGAINST 
SELF-INCRIMINATION 
In Ellison v. Maryland, 310 Md. 244, 528 
A.2d 1271 (1987), the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland held that one who has been con-
victed and sentenced in a criminal proceed-
ing may invoke the fifth amendment 
privilege against self-incrimination when 
called to testify as a non-party witness in a 
subsequent proceeding provided that the 
thirty-day time limit for taking an appeal 
or requesting a sentence review has not 
expired. The Court of Special Appeals of 
Maryland had similarly held the privilege 
applicable but had based their decision on 
a rationale which the court of appeals 
found to be unsupported by precedent. 
Clinton Ellison and Tyrone Little, 
inmates at the Maryland Penitentiary, 
were charged in the Circuit Court for Bal-
timore City with the robbery and first 
degree murder of fellow inmate Charles 
Sneed. Additionally, Ellison and Little 
were charged with lesser included substan-
tive offenses and the state filed notices of 
intent to seek the death penalty. 
The defendants were tried separately, 
with the first case against Little. After clos-
ing arguments, but before a jury verdict 
was returned, the state and Little entered 
into a plea agreement. Little agreed to 
plead guilty to second degree murder in 
return for the state's promise to nol pros 
the first degree murder charge as well as 
the robbery and lesser charges. The state 
also agreed to recommend a twenty-five 
year jail sentence to be served concurrent-
ly with Little's prior sentence. The agree-
ment was carried out as proposed and 
Little was sentenced on June 18, 1984. At 
that time the trial court advised Little that 
he had thirty days in which to request 
either an appeal of his conviction to the 
court of special appeals or a review of his 
sentence by a three judge panel of the cir-
cuit court. 
Ellison's trial began on June 25, 1984, 
seven days after Little had been sentenced. 
During the course of the trial, and before 
Little's thirty-day period in which to 
request an appeal or sentence review had 
expired, Little was called by Ellison to tes-
tify as a witness for the defense. Little 
invoked the fifth amendment privilege 
against self-incrimination and refused to 
testify. The trial court upheld Little's 
invoking of the privilege and Ellison was 
subsequently found guilty of first degree 
murder and robbery. He was sentenced to 
life imprisonment for the murder and 
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